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ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Farrell Acquired a "Premarital
Interest" in the House.

The appellee ("Farrell") does not dispute that the appellant ("Ann") paid all
of the expenses for a home that was built prior to the parties' marriage. Nor does
he dispute that while he was working on the house Ann paid him a sum
commensurate with his previous wages. Farrell does not dispute that the house
was completed before the parties were married, and that it was titled solely in
Ann's name. Furthermore, the house was not acquired by the parties during their
marriage. The district court never specifically held that the house was marital
property, and, in any event, any such finding would be clearly erroneous.
vJ

The proper analysis in this case consists of two separate steps. The parties
are in agreement that under Utah law the first determination that a district court
vJj

must make is whether property is "marital or separate." Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT
App 236, il 24, 9 P.3d 171. Farrell states in his brief that "'the court shouldfirst
~

properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the
separate ·property of one or the other." Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant
("Brief of Appellee") at 16 (emphasis in original) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d

1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).
vi

As Farrell points out, once the district court has made the initial
determination of whether property is marital, the court can "next" determine

vi
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"whether there are exceptional circumstances that overcome the general
presumption that marital property be divided equally between the parties." Brief of
Appellee at 16.
The problem with Farrell's argument (and with the district court's ruling) is
that the argument conflates the two steps of the analysis. The court does not even
reach the question of exceptional circumstances unless and until the court first
determines that the property is marital. And the exceptional-circumstances test is
not part of the analysis of whether the property is separate or marital.
Under Utah law "[m]arital property is ordinarily all propefo/ acquired during
marriage." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(emphas~s added). There is no question that the house was acquired prior to
marriage, not "during marriage." It is undispu~ed that the house was built and an
occupancy permit was obtained before the parties were married. It therefore
cannot be said that Farrell acquired a marital interest in the home-the parties
simply were not married.
Farrell argues-and the district court ruled-that Farrell obtained a
premarital interest in the house. A "premarital interest" is by definition not a

marital interest, and it must be based on legal principles other that those announced
in _Dunn and other cases regarding the equal division of marital property. Farrell
did not argue below that he was entitled to an interest in the house under such legal
2
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"
theories as unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, constructive contract, etc. And
there was no finding or determination by the district court that any of these theories
entitled Farrell to a share of the house. Any so-called "premarital" interest must be
based upon l~gal principles. Here the district court did not explain what a
"premarital interest" is or under what legal doctrine such an interest was or can be
acquired. Farrell argues that adopting Ann's position would "create a new way to
entice and steal from someone." Brief of Appellee at 11. However, the district
court did not find any conduct even approaching the requirements for a
determination of theft in this case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the
district court's ruling that Farrell acquired a "premarital" interest in the house.
~

II.

The District Court Did Not Err in Relying on Farrell's Own Evaluation
of the Value of Oldroyd Custom Woodworks.

Unlike the house, which was acquired prior to marriage, a business called
\JP

"Oldroyd Custom Woodworks" was formed and developed during the marriage.
R. 619. Farrell argues that the district court erred in relying on Farrell's own
sworn statement in valuing the business. Brief of Appellant at 17-18. This is
wrong. It was not erroneous for the district court to accept Farrell's own
statements under oath about the value of the business.

~
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III.

The Alleged Minor Mathematical Error Regarding the Honda Civic Is
Not Reversible Error.

Assuming that the district court was attempting to equalize the relationship
between the parties with respect to (and only with respect to ) a Honda Civic and a
Harley Davidson, Farrell appears to be correct in arguing that the district court
made a minor mathematical error. However, it is not clear that this assumption is
correct. Furthermore, even if an error was committed, the error should be viewed
in the overall context of the district court's decision regarding the parties' vehicles.
For instance, as noted by the district court, "the parties agreed that the Chrysler
would not be sold by either party." R. 621. And "the court entered an order in
October 2013 that prohibited the sale or disposition of the Chrysler 300." Id.
However, Farrell sold the Chrysler in September 2013. Id. The district court noted
that "there were statements that the Chrysler 300 was sold to a relative for less than
its worth." Id. In the context of the foregoing, the district court's $4,000 possible
mathematical error with respect to the Honda Civic is not reversible error. It is
possible that the district court was considering broader issues related to the parties'
vehicles.
Furthermore, counsel for Fa~e11 approved the form of the district court's
findings. R. 624. Any purely mathematical errors should have been called to the
attention of the district court so that the district court could correct them. Where it
is possible that the district court fully intended to make an $8,000 adjustment in
4
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Ann's favor with respect to the vehicles, any objection to the form of the order has
been waived.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of
the district court with respect to the house, and it should affirm the judgment with
respect to the business and the vehicles.
DATED this 11 th day of May, 2016.

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
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